tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22657443.post8973826299845176847..comments2023-12-31T03:18:37.403-06:00Comments on "E pur si muove!": Tragedy of the Anticommons: Too Much Ownership?Lester Hunthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14746157071827337723noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22657443.post-27790411455310631842010-04-01T23:38:03.929-05:002010-04-01T23:38:03.929-05:00Way late to the party...
If you were trying to bu...Way late to the party...<br /><br />If you were trying to build a plane, it'd be really hard to negotiate with all 10 patent-holders at the same time. Lets say you budgeted 10k for each patent, and you secured the first 9 patents at that price. <br /><br />The 10th patent-holder is going to see that and say "Well, well, well... you already sunk 90k into this project, and you still don't have the right to build a plane. Before you said you were willing to pay 100k for that right, I think I'll be generous and charge you 99k." At this point, the manufacturer either caves in to the demands or folds up shop and goes bankrupt.<br /><br />This is sort of like what was happening in the Senate when the Dems were trying to get 60 votes. They only had a pool of about 60 possible people, so they needed unanimity in order to get anything passed, but this was really difficult because people would always come out of the woodwork to make an outrageous demand, I believe Ben Nelson was asking for some sort of Cornhusker Kickback or something. You had a situation where lawmakers were threatening to vote against a law they wanted to pass - they figured if they didn't take advantage, someone else would. Pretty tragic.<br /><br />It seems like this tragedy of the anti-commons arises from the need for unanimity, a situation in which the greediest man will wait til it looks like everyone else is signing on, then he'll step forward to make extortionary demands. Eminent Domain is another example of this. It would be like if 10 different people owned the same buffalo, the only way to negotiate for its slaughter is if you got all of them in front of you at the same time, told them to put their heads together, and come up with with a price. It sort of sounds like that's what that licensing body was created to do. <br /><br />Coordination is the operative word, more so than cooperation. Maybe someone already said this, my reading comprehension tends to sundown.Nethhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16204927740294369853noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22657443.post-91089165195478919072008-12-10T17:04:00.000-06:002008-12-10T17:04:00.000-06:00There's another factor dropping an increasingly im...There's another factor dropping an increasingly immobilizing net over both the traditional commons and individual ownership. That's the use of lawsuit or threat of lawsuit to assert some non-owner privilege, or some apology that needs to be made, or any presumed wrong that needs to be righted.<BR/><BR/>David E. Bernstein in <B>You Can't Say That!</B> discusses the growth of censorship, compelled speech, legally compelled association, and so on. While his focus is on civil liberties, many of his examples involve assertions of rights against either public or private ownership.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22657443.post-65166251119051872752008-08-19T09:52:00.000-05:002008-08-19T09:52:00.000-05:00Theodore, that's pretty good, though it's unlikely...Theodore, that's pretty good, though it's unlikely that the right to exclude ever truly extended to the "heavens above." The question was merely academic until the advent of skyscrapers and airplanes, but it <A HREF="http://books.google.com/books?id=P3zgl1nsea0C&pg=RA1-PA180&lpg=RA1-PA180&dq=%22necessary+for+the+ordinary+use+and+enjoyment+of+the+land'%22&source=web&ots=EVFDiibUUG&sig=cGKeSe7REQPIW6P93ImOXIpwSR4&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=3&ct=result#PRA1-PA180,M1" REL="nofollow">seems</A> more accurate to describe the situation as one in which the rule was clarified rather than dissolved.Michael Drakehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06141593700908475896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22657443.post-777476093262871722008-08-19T08:02:00.000-05:002008-08-19T08:02:00.000-05:00Mr. Nordsieck,I've noticed that all of the example...Mr. Nordsieck,<BR/><BR/>I've noticed that all of the examples that make sense seem to be about intellectual property -- which, to use your term, is non-rival (which I take to mean if I use it then the whole thing is still there for you to use). Why this should be so, I haven't figured out yet. (No doubt, there are economists who have written about it at length and I just don't know their stuff!.) <BR/><BR/>The disappearance of the ad coelum rule {that a landowner owns everything above it, to infinity)with the advent of human flight is a very interesting example. I'll have to think about it.Lester Hunthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14746157071827337723noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22657443.post-4233004957697442022008-08-19T05:33:00.000-05:002008-08-19T05:33:00.000-05:00One thing to note in particular is that the anti-c...One thing to note in particular is that the anti-commons shows up almost exclusively in nonrival property. The one good example I know of the anti-commons being a problem for rivalrous property is the dissolution of the ad coelum rule with the advent of flight, although I suspect that water right probably suffers a bit from this as well.Theodore Nordsieckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06914221789495374112noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22657443.post-61567573107051060112008-08-15T11:02:00.000-05:002008-08-15T11:02:00.000-05:00Nat and Commenter Formerly Known as ...,Interestin...Nat and Commenter Formerly Known as ...,<BR/><BR/>Interesting that you both suggest that high transaction cost is the real problem (when there is one). That makes sense to me. And of course the same thing does <I>not</I> make sense in the case of the tragedy of the commons. There, the property rights situation has to be changed somehow (either via creating ownership or via regulation) before things can get any better.Lester Hunthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14746157071827337723noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22657443.post-30894535798048582362008-08-14T14:04:00.000-05:002008-08-14T14:04:00.000-05:00Just to add to your comments, the commons problem ...Just to add to your comments, the commons problem obtains because the goods in question are rivalrous. So it doesn't even make sense to apply a commons analysis to intellectual property. The veto problem is simply a garden-variety transaction cost.<BR/><BR/>(For identification purposes, I am the commenter formerly known as "Q" the Enchanter.)Michael Drakehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06141593700908475896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22657443.post-18385926454345851792008-08-14T13:54:00.000-05:002008-08-14T13:54:00.000-05:00Dad,I think you're giving Dr. Heller too much cred...Dad,<BR/><BR/>I think you're giving Dr. Heller too much credit saying that he proposes the solution ofcreating a common pool. In the example of the WWI airplanes, each airplane company still had to pay a fee in order to use a copyright they didn't own, so clearly the mechanics of private property rightswere still in place. What Heller is seeing is a phenomenon that's been known in economics for quite a while: transaction costs. The culprit in the airplane problem wasn't too much ownership,it was that the companies couldn't come together for mutual benefit when clearly cooperation would have yielded more profit than using their "veto powers" against one another. The issue of veto powers can only be used againstthe use of private property if somehow cooperation and trade would yield less profit than clinging to your property (which seems more like an issue of negative externalities to me). Otherwise, it's merely an issue of transaction costs.<BR/><BR/>-Nat HuntNathttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16595344133679481703noreply@blogger.com